Do Hypersonic Weapons Affect Strategic Nuclear Balance?

This piece will explore how hypersonic weapons affect strategic nuclear balance of power. I am certain that these weapons, while technologically marvellous and very disruptive within theatre of conflict, are not bringing any change to strategic landscape. Rather, I am certain that those weapons, specifically Avangard, are the result of Russian hedging strategy in case the US attempts to change nuclear balance of power by making Anti-Ballistic Missiles capable of countering large-scale strike from Russia. First, I will explain what strategic nuclear weapons are. Then, I will show why current strategic systems are more than a sufficient deterrent. Finally, I will explain why Avangard is necessary as a hedging strategy.

Strategic nuclear weapons are those that have the potential to cause major strategic damage to the adversary deep inside its territory, as opposed to tactical nuclear weapons that are meant to be used within the theatre of conflict. While strategic nuclear weapons normally have much higher yield than TNW, mainly due to need of armies to move forward after he attack, that is not key distinction. For example, one could place a 10Mt bomb into dump truck and it would be unable to target deep into adversary’s territory. Meanwhile, lower yield warheads on top of ICBMs could perform a disarming first strike against silos, thus being strategic weapons. Most emerging hypersonic weapons are meant to be used within theatre of conflict.[1] However, Avangard is the exception as this manoeuvrable glide body can travel across thousands of kilometres upon being released by ICBM. Its manoeuvrability makes it invulnerable to current defences, but is there a need for such system?

Modern nuclear delivery systems are fully capable of dealing with current missile defines. There are currently 4 active systems capable of countering ICBMs. Most advanced of those is American Ground Based Midcourse Defense System. This system provides continental protection for the US and intercepts the missile during the midcourse phase of the flight (in space) by kinetic impact which destroys the warhead. However, the efficacy of this system is limited. In has been shown in testing as capable of intercepting ICBMs, but the odds of such interception are 0.56, or 56%. Furthermore, testing was done under conditions of proper weather and knowledge of the launch making the interception likelihood in wartime scenario certainly lesser. To reliably (with chance of success of 97%) block an incoming warhead, 4 interceptors would have to be fired per warhead. With its current inventory of 44 Ground Base Interceptors, the US could stop only 11 warheads, with some small chance of a warhead escaping. This means that the system is incapable of stopping true strategic nuclear attack, including from North Korea, let alone nuclear superpower like Russia. By comparison, Russian heavy ICBM R-36M2 “Satan” carries 10 warheads. Cost of ABM is very high, at roughly 75 million per GBI while an ICBM carrying several warheads can be made for roughly 5-10 times less money, making the cost difference of up to 100 to 1 when MIRVS are included. Furthermore, newer ICBMs, especially in Russia, come equipped with dozens of decoys that are extremely hard to discern in midcourse phase in addition to various other radar affecting measures. This means that GMD is incapable of stopping any significant attack. American AEGIS system has recently become compatible with limited anti-ICBM role with the testing of recently introduced of the SM-3 II A. However, this system is also very expensive and its anti-ICBM capability has been confirmed only against slower ICBMs (with ranges closer to 5500km) and whether they could possibly intercept missiles like Trident or Satan is very questionable. Israeli-American Arrow 3 is poised to be able to counter ICBMs, but due to Israel being a small power this would not be capable of affecting superpower balance in any meaningful way.[2]A-135 Amur is Russian nuclear ABM which is capable of dealing with several warheads as well, but only around the Moscow area. Meanwhile, the costs of this system are also very high with Russia maintaining only 68 interceptors.[3] This shows that any significant nuclear arsenal, especially one as large and advanced as Russian, is more than capable deterrent without Avangard, especially with advances in countermeasures during 2000s and 2010s. So, if the Avangard does not change the nuclear balance of power, why would someone spend vast amounts into research and development of such system?

The Avangard system functions as a safeguard meant to cement the nuclear balance of power. During the Cold War, the USA and USSR were staying away from conflict thanks to Mutually Assured Destruction, meaning that both sides were certain that if they were to attack the other, even if by attacking silos, the other would be able to respond via survivable ballistic missile submarines and road-mobile launchers ultimately sealing the fate of the adversary that attacked first. In order to curb expensive arms race, both sides were signing treaties (like START) limiting the number of strategic warheads and keeping the parity.[4] However, a prerequisite to this was the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by Nixon and Brezhnev. Both sides realised that the more ABM system one builds, more weapons the other will have to build in order to surpass them. Given the costs of ABM systems as compared to ICBMs, USA and USSR both realised that they could not stop the others’ weapons and that they would just be increasing the number of weapons targeting them by increasing the number of warheads. Thus, in order to stop the spiral of vertical proliferation this treaty was formed, followed by numerous other treaties. Both sides were limited to a single site (originally two) of up to 100 missiles to protect themselves from accidental nuclear strike, without significantly affecting the nuclear balance. However, in 2002, the US under President George Bush had left the ABMT. This has led to various attempts from Putin to prolong and later reforge the treaty, ultimately leading to nuclear modernization.

Officially, the US left the treaty in order to protect itself from potential strikes by Iran and North Korea. In truth, US defences are mainly focused onto Pacific, with some focused on the Atlantic, leaving the North Pole, where Russian missiles would come from, open. This shows no intent of blocking Russian missiles and making nuclear war winnable. And here is the thing, intentions in international security are irrelevant, weather friendly or malicious. Maybe US does not have the intention now, but the capacities are improving. Ever since 2002, numbers of GMDs have increased. Aegis has gained anti-ICBM capability. THAAD could potentially get such capacity as well. There are concepts for ABMs mounted with several Exo-Atmospheric kill vehicles that could potentially counter MIRV. If the US does gain such capacity, who can be sure that it won’t simply change its mind? Or that new government with attitudes more akin to Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative, this time with capability, won’t come? Or that some unpredictable revolution happens? Balance of power is balance of power, not intentions, and as such building a weapon like Avangard was a necessary hedging. The glider is flying through the atmosphere thus avoiding all ex-atmospheric ICBM defences by default. Furthermore, its manoeuvrability combined with maximal speed of Mach 27 make it virtually unblockable by endo-atmospheric interceptors.[5] Even once capable endo-atmospheric interceptors are made, they will not be able to provide continental defence due to air drag, but rather local or regional protection. This means that Avangard is there to stop any changes in the nuclear balance of power by cementing it. While currently mounted upon first strike weapon, the UR-100N ICBM, this technological development makes it possible for the system to be mounted upon second strike systems, as was proposed with the RS-26 Rubezh. Overall, Avangard is there to make sure that ABMs do not disrupt the current parity.

Avangard does not change nuclear balance between superpowers at all. However, Avangard is there to make sure that even if there are attempts to changes the balance of power with ABMs, balance of power does not change. For now, 4 systems have been procured with the first two coming in 2019. In the next article, I will explore how hypersonic weapons are changing international security from the perspective of conventional war.

[1] AGM-183 ARRW could play a similar role if mounted upon a B-52 strategic bomber, but it is stated to have a different purpose and due to more limited range the carrier would be somewhat vulnerable. Similar could be said of Kh-47M2, if it actually gets integrated with Tu-22M3M. [2] Indian ABM Prithvi Defence Vehicle Mark 2 has been shown as capable of intercepting satellites meaning that it could potentially also intercept an ICBM, but due to it still not being serially produced, it will not be able to affect strategic stability in short nor medium term. [3] Prospective Russian systems A-235 Nudol and S-500 should also have anti-ICBM capability. [4] TNW are not regulated by treaties. [5] Even ABM lasers, once and if developed, are extremely unlikely to block it since the system is built to work under extreme heat.