The Mullah and the Ayatollah

I am apprehensive of the new man in Tehran. Ebrahim Raisi is a hard-line cleric now in charge of the executive branch of an extremist theocratic entity. He has played a role in the execution of about 5,000 opponents of the Iranian regime in the 1980s, and the lethal crackdowns on anti-government protestors as recently as 2009 and 2019. He has no government experience but is well linked to the Revolutionary Guards and the security apparatus. The entire campaign was arranged to ensure his victory and Iranians knew it. No major reformist candidate was allowed to contest the elections, so naturally the turnout wasn’t so great (around 50%). The Iranian people did not partake in this democratic charade designed to co-opt their vote to ensure Raisi’s legitimacy. The only liberal candidate approved was Abdolnasser Hemmati, and he too is politically inexperienced and is linked with the Rouhani government. The Iranian people boycotted these elections in protest of the theocracy. Unchallenged, the conservatives won big in every field; executive, judiciary, and legislative. To make matters worse, the Americans have Raisi on the sanctions list! Even now, under the liberal government, America and Iran negotiate by proxy in Vienna. With this man at the helm negotiations will be complicated further. This is a dangerous man with no respect for human rights, and he shall therefore not have the respect of those governments who value them.

So what does this mean for the JCPOA? First, we should talk about the conservative liberal divide in Iran. In Iran, generally speaking, the liberals are western educated while the conservatives are educated within Iran. They both swear allegiance to the supreme leader and to the theocracy, but with the liberals one is able to somewhat negotiate. They are more pragmatic so to speak. The conservatives are more ideological. They take a literal hard-line, and unfortunately they are more influential. One can make a deal with the liberals, but to sustain it one must deal with the conservative establishment because their clout and their pressure can rupture that deal.

The softness of the liberal camp is a pressure point the conservatives exploit, even though that softness is the source of their much needed pragmatism. The conservatives are able to tap into that reserve to bolster their own legitimacy whilst also benefiting from whatever deal the liberals chalk up. I’m saying this because that happened with both Khatami and Rafsanajani both of whom supported their nuclear program for peaceful purposes, the two-state solution in Israel/Palestine, and rapprochement with the Arabs and the West. Meanwhile Ahmedinjad did not- to say the least- and ran on a public platform of criticizing these men for their softness. Najad did not support the two-state solution and believes 9/11 was an inside job. He rhetorically did say that the nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, though. During his term, relations with the West and the Arabs deteriorated significantly, but the gains Rafsanjani and Khatami made served Iran’s interests for a time. The more this happens, though, the less willing the world will be to negotiate with Iran.

The countries in the region do fear a nuclear Iran, but I do not personally think Iran is that stupid. They have done well with their system of asymmetric warfare. They do not need to ruin their stratagem with undesirable nuclear warheads. Such things serve as a card in a poker game to say ‘if Israel can have it why can’t we?’ The usual answer is Israel’s democracy, but I have clarified that Israel is in some ways an ethno-religious state more than it is a democracy. Iran’s violation of the paradigms of the JCPOA is their way of making noise. They will not go for weapons grade uranium. But that does not mean we should blindly trust them. The deal is a good thing, but they should not be given more than what they are conceding. It must be more profitable to the west than it is for Iran. The leverage is there, and it can be done tactfully. Concessions on more than just the nuclear issue should be made. There should be more emphasis on the C in JCPOA than there currently is. The deficiencies in the existing framework should be righted, and it should be done while Rouhani is still in command for reasons of pragmatism.

The impetus on Rouhani to make a deal now is greater. It will be his legacy and the concessions he makes will be cannon fodder for the conservatives. They will say that this deal is shameful, but they will not strike it down. They will shift blame onto the liberals whilst taking the credit for the sanctions relief that their pragmatism will bring. Iran needs the deal. Khamenei knows it, Rouhani knows it, and Raisi knows it. They’ve all publicly supported it too. It wasn’t even a major debate topic during the elections, given the Supreme Leaders’ stance on it. They- the conservatives-want to throw Rouhani under the bus for it because Khamenei and Raisi don’t want to appear weak by providing the concessions they know are required. That’s what liberals like Rouhani are for, and he will likely comply because it is in the national economic interest. But the fact that the Supreme Leader supports the JCPOA means that the JCPOA will probably endure despite the election of Raisi. But what sort of president is this powerless? One in a theocratic state it would seem. This is why the deal should make Rouhani look good. To incentivize him to strike the deal despite the pressure in Tehran.

The ongoing talks in Vienna are closer to agreement than ever. The incentive for this is what I have already mentioned. Sanctions relief victory for Raisi, but the blame for the concessions falls on Rouhani. The west will continue to want sanctions on Raisi, and that will probably be the biggest stumbling block towards the deal, but it can be overcome. In the end, the interests of the theocracy outweigh the interests of Raisi. The thing is, sanctions are only an effective tool when they are used as a carrot. In this interesting carrot and stick analogy, sanctions are both the carrot and the stick. When Donald Trump removed the USA from the JCPOA he effectively removed the carrot. That’s why the Iranians are asking for things the USA cannot accept, more than just sanctions relief. They’re asking for reparations and the representation of the deals that never materialized after sanctions were replaced. That’s the liberals way of reducing the criticism that the conservatives will throw at them. Legacy politics. They won’t get all of what they want. They’ll get a deal. The supreme leader will accept it. Raisi will get something to work with. And Rouhani will be thrown under the bus. Such is the price for Khamenai’s ‘resistance economy’. Even today, his deal with Beijing fills itself with hot air and bland rhetoric. Nothing truly substantial or tangible.

In Iran, the Supreme Leader is the head of state. He does not govern, that task falls to the president, but he rules. He decides what is acceptable and what isn’t. He appoints the assembly of experts who approve the president. He is a representation of God’s will and is a check on the ‘corruption’ caused by human democracy. The role of the president and his men here is to advise the supreme leader. They can sway him in more pragmatic directions, and that is good for those of us who want to avoid conflict with Iran. His engineering of Raisi’s win, however, bodes poorly for this goal. An ideologue has appointed a fellow ideologue, his student! Now maybe the president won’t be an adviser to the supreme leader, but an executer of his will. His government will probably advise him, and he will defer to his master. He has no real government experience after all making him a fine puppet. His actions, however, are the true test. For that is how one can examine statesmen. I hope I am terribly wrong about all this. I hope Iran can engage in good neighbourly conduct regionally and friendly outward politics globally. That would bring a much needed sense of peaceful calmness and security to us all.

This undemocratic, theocratic, republican system is what rules in Iran, and it inexplicably persists in spite of it all. Economic crises, popular disillusionment, war, and international isolation. These things bring down empires, and yet Iran endures. This can be chalked up to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. That cataclysmic event sent shockwaves across the Islamic world. Conservatives in Arabia practically became hardliners overnight on either side of the Islamic schism. Liberals became conservatives. Within Iran, the monarchy was abolished and a fervent theocratic class assumed power. Faced with the above mentioned challenges, this class was intrinsically and ideologically motivated to defend their revolution. They were able to replace the old government and eradicate the security deficiencies that allowed them to do just that. Indeed, they have experience in toppling government and regime change, so it naturally follows that they know how to prevent others from doing just that. They may not govern well, but they know how to hold onto power.

In a sense each crisis that befalls Iran, domestic or otherwise, actually strengthens the regime because it tests their ideological fervour. Each time they emerge victorious, it strengthens their commitment to the Islamic Revolution. This is the relevance of both the liberals’ and conservatives’ loyalty and allegiance to the Supreme Leader. His word is the word of God, and the revolution- in their twisted theocratic view-is an act of God. By holding elections in this paradigm, the Iranian system grants freedom of speech within an accepted framework. Limitless debate with pre-defined talking points. This is a false democracy to be sure, but it serves to protect the Islamic Revolution, which is a state-strength. It defines Iran’s identity in constructivist terms. Referring to Noam Chomsky’s brilliant point on this he says ‘The smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum - even encourage the more critical and dissident views. That gives people the sense that there's free thinking going on, while all the time the presuppositions of the system are being reinforced by the limits put on the range of the debate.’ This was not said about Iran precisely, but one can apply it perfectly.

In summary, democracies are fickle things. They rely on trust and popular collaboration. Dictatorships led by strongmen are as weak as the men in charge. If the man grows ill, so does the state. But democracies are strong in another way. While decisions may not be taken with maximum efficiency or immediate effect, they include the input of multiple statesmen. The state literally follows the maxim ‘two brains are better than one’. A dictatorship has the brain capacity of its dictator. More efficient, less enlightened.

But what about revolutionary states? Revolutionary states face the same sort of crises both of the aforementioned states do, but because of their ideological zeal and intrinsic motivation they are less likely to succumb to them. With each crisis they get stronger. They endure. They are not immortal. The Soviet Union did collapse. They are not the most efficient. China did suffer a famine not too long ago. But the crises they endure make them stronger. In democracies, the crises make them weaker. In dictatorships- some of which come about via weak democracies- the crises can bring about a new dictator or a revolutionary regime. Yet quality of life is at its maximum in democratic states. What I mean by democratic states are those that are governed by the people and for the people with their interests in mind. Not some abstract higher goal that serves the people as in revolutionary regimes (e.g. Islamic theocracy or communism) but the material interests of the people. There must be a way to have strong institutions, full human rights in accordance to the democratic desires of the people, high quality of life, and moderation all under one system. Usually one points to the Scandinavian countries in these instances, but even there one can find polarization on either side of the spectrum. These broad strokes are my perfect system. I do not have a name for it yet, but if I can conceptualize it one day perhaps that will be a step in the right direction.

In a world that is conducive to the corrosion of democracy and the preservation of autocracy we have a responsibility to enshrine holiness not in some higher authority but in institutionalism, constitutionalism, civil-liberties, and other tenets of civilisation. Only then can we have a stable state that serves the material interests of the people above all else- for what else is a state good for if not the betterment of the lives of its citizens?